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Abstract
We present a formal multiagent framework for coordinating a class of
collaborative industrial practices called “Industrial Symbiotic Networks
(ISNs)” as cooperative games. The game-theoretic formulation of ISNs
enables systematic reasoning about what we call the ISN implemen-
tation problem. Specifically, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to
the inapplicability of standard fair and stable benefit allocation meth-
ods. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and following the literature on
normative multiagent systems, we consider regulations and normative
socio-economic policies as coordination instruments that in combina-
tion with ISN games resolve the situation. In this multiagent system,
employing Marginal Contribution Nets (MC-Nets) as rule-based coop-
erative game representations foster the combination of regulations and
ISN games with no loss in expressiveness. We develop algorithmic meth-
ods for generating regulations that ensure the implementability of ISNs
and as a policy support, present the policy requirements that guaran-
tee the implementability of all the desired ISNs in a balanced-budget
way.
Keywords: Multiagent Systems, Formal Methods, Industrial
Symbiosis, Normative Coordination, Cooperative Games.
1. Introduction
Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs) are mainly seen as collabora-
tive networks of industries with the aim to reduce the use of virgin
1Corresponding author. E-mail address: V.Yazdanpanah@soton.ac.uk (Vahid Yazdan-
panah).
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material by circulating reusable resources (e.g., physical waste mate-
rial and energy) among the network members [10, 29, 43]. In such
networks, symbiosis leads to socio-economic and environmental ben-
efits for involved industrial agents and the society (see [14, 39]). One
barrier against stable ISN implementations is the lack of frameworks
able to secure such networks against unfair and unstable allocation
of obtainable benefits among the involved industrial firms. In other
words, although in general ISNs result in the reduction of the total cost,
a remaining challenge for operationalization of ISNs is to tailor reason-
able mechanisms for allocating the total obtainable cost reductions—in
a fair and stable manner—among the contributing firms. Otherwise,
even if economic benefits are foreseeable, lack of stability and/or fair-
ness may lead to non-cooperative decisions. This will be the main fo-
cus of what we call the industrial symbiosis implementation problem.
Reviewing recent contributions in the field of industrial symbiosis re-
search, we encounter studies focusing on the necessity to consider
interrelations between industrial enterprises [43, 47] and the role of
contract settings in the process of ISN implementation [1, 44]. We be-
lieve that a missed element for shifting from theoretical ISN design to
practical ISN implementation is to model, reason about, and support
ISN decision processes in a dynamic way (and not by using snapshot-
based modeling frameworks).
For such a multiagent setting, the mature field of cooperative game
theory provides rigorous methodologies and established solution con-
cepts, e.g. the core of the game and the Shapley allocation [15, 30, 34,
7]. However, for ISNs modeled as a cooperative game, these established
solution concepts may be either non-feasible (due to properties of the
game, e.g. being unbalanced) or non-applicable (due to properties that
the industrial domain asks for but solution concepts cannot ensure,
e.g. individual as well as collective rationality). This calls for contextu-
alized multiagent solutions that take into account both the complexi-
ties of ISNs and the characteristics of the employable game-theoretical
solution concepts. Accordingly, inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and
following the literature on normative multi-agent systems [40, 22, 3],
we consider regulative rules and normative socio-economic policies as
two elements that in combination with ISN games result in the intro-
duction of the novel concept of Coordinated ISNs (C−ISNs)2. We formally
present regulations as monetary incentive rules to enforce desired in-
dustrial collaborations with respect to an established policy. Regard-
ing our representational approach, we use Marginal Contribution Nets
(MC-Nets) as rule-based cooperative game representations. This sim-
ply fosters the combination of regulative rules and ISN games with no
2See [42] for multiagent solution concepts in general and [8, 16] for their application
in the industrial domain.
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loss in expressiveness. Accordingly, applying regulatory rules to ISNs
enables ISN policy-makers to transform ISN games and ensure the im-
plementability of desired ones in a fair and stable manner.
In this work, we provide a coordinated multiagent system—using
MC-net cooperative games—for the implementation phase of ISNs. More-
over, we develop algorithmic methods for generating regulations that
ensure the implementability of ISNs. Finally, as a policy support, we
show the ISN policy requirements that guarantee the implementability
of all the desired industrial collaborations in a balanced-budget way.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual
analysis on ISNs and allocation problems in such multiagent collabo-
rative networks. Section 3 introduces preliminary formal notions and
game theoretic solution concepts required for our ISN implementation
framework. Sections 4 and 5 present our ISN frameworks and illustrate
the verified results on effectivity of the developed coordinated multia-
gent system for implementing industrial symbiosis. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper by highlighting the main contributions and poten-
tial extensions of this work.
2. Conceptual Analysis
In this section, we (1) present the intuition behind our approach
using a running example, (2) discuss our norm-based perspective for
capturing ISN regulations, (3) describe the evaluation criteria for an
ideal ISN implementation framework, and 4) review previous work on
tailoring game-theoretic solution concepts for industrial symbiosis im-
plementation problem.
2.1. ISN as a Multiagent Practice
To explain the dynamics of implementing ISNs as multiagent indus-
trial practices, we use a running example. Imagine three industries i, j,
and k in an industrial park such that ri, rj, and rk are among recyclable
resources in the three firms’ wastes, respectively. Moreover, i, j, and k
require rk, ri, and rj as their primary inputs, respectively. In such sce-
narios, discharging wastes and purchasing traditional primary inputs
are transactions that incur cost. Hence, having the chance to reuse
a material, firms prefer recycling and transporting reusable resources
to other enterprises if such transactions result in obtainable cost re-
ductions for both parties—meaning that it reduces the related costs for
discharging wastes (on the resource provider side) and purchasing cost
(on the resource receiver side). On the other hand, the implementation
of such an industrial network involves transportation, treatment, and
transaction costs. In principle, aggregating resource treatment pro-
cesses using refineries, combining transaction costs, and coordinating
joint transportation may lead to significant cost reductions at the col-
lective level.
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What we call the industrial symbiosis implementation problem fo-
cuses on challenges—and accordingly seeks solutions—for sharing this
collectively obtainable benefit among the involved firms. Simply stated,
the applied method for distributing the total obtainable benefit among
involved agents is crucial while reasoning about implementing an ISN.
Imagine a scenario in which symbiotic relations ij, ik, and jk, respec-
tively result in 4, 5, and 4 utility units of benefit, the symbiotic network
ijk leads to 6 units of benefit, and each agent can be involved in at
most one symbiotic relation. To implement the ijk ISN, one main ques-
tion is about the method for distributing the benefit value 6 among the
three agents such that they all be induced to implement this ISN. For
instance, as i and k can obtain 5 utils together, they will defect the ISN
ijk if we divide the 6 units of util equally (2 utils to each agent). Note
that allocating benefit values lower than their “traditional” benefits—
that is obtainable in case firms defect the collaboration—results in
unstable ISNs.Moreover, unfair mechanisms that disregard the con-
tribution of firms may cause the firms to move to other ISNs that do
so. In brief, even if an ISN results in sufficient cost reductions (at
the collective level), its implementation and applied allocation methods
determine whether it will be realized and maintained. Our main objec-
tive in this work is to provide a multiagent implementation framework
for ISNs that enables fair and stable allocation of obtainable benefits.
In further sections, we review two standard allocation methods, dis-
cuss their applicability for benefit-sharing in ISNs, and introduce our
normatively-coordinated multiagent system to guarantee stability and
fairness in ISNs.
2.2. ISN Regulations as socio-economic Norms
In real cases, ISNs take place under regulations that concern envi-
ronmental as well as societal policies. Hence, industrial agents have to
comply to a set of rules. For instance, avoiding waste discharge may
be encouraged (i.e., normatively promoted) by the local authority or
transporting a specific type of hazardous waste may be forbidden (i.e.,
normatively prohibited) in a region. Accordingly, to nudge the collec-
tive behavior, monetary incentives in the form of subsidies and taxes
are well-established solutions. This shows that the ISN implemen-
tation problem is not only about decision processes among strategic
utility-maximizing industry representatives (at a microeconomic level)
but in addition involves regulatory dimensions—such as presence of
binding/encouraging monetary incentives (at a macroeconomic level).
To capture the regulatory dimension of ISNs, we apply a norma-
tive policy that respects the socio-economic as well as environmental
desirabilities and categorizes possible coalitions of industries in three
classes of: promoted, permitted, and prohibited. Accordingly, the reg-
ulatory agent respects this classification and allocates incentives such
that industrial agents will be induced to: implement promoted ISNs
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Figure 1: At the microeconomic level, A represents the set of all benefit allocation meth-
ods that are preferable for all the firms. At the macroeconomic level, due to the intro-
duced coordination mechanism by the regulatory agent (respecting the established socio-
economic policy), we have the allocation set Aˆ either equal to A or as a shrunk/extended
version of it.
and avoid prohibited ones (while permitted ISNs are neutral from the
policy-maker’s point of view). For instance, in our ISN scenario, allocat-
ing 10 units of incentive to ijk and 0 to other possible ISNs induces all
the rational agents to form the grand coalition and implement ijk—as
they cannot benefit more in case they defect. We call the ISNs that take
place under regulations, Coordinated ISNs (C−ISNs). Note that the term
“coordination” in this context refers to the application and efficacy of
monetary incentive mechanisms in the ISN implementation phase, and
should not be confused with ISN administration (i.e., managing the evo-
lution of relations). Figure 1 presents a schematic view on the role of
the regulatory agents in C−ISNs.
2.3. Evaluation Criteria for ISN Implementation Frameworks
Dealing with firms that perform in a complex multiagent industrial
context calls for implementation platforms that can be tuned to spe-
cific settings, can be scaled for implementing various ISN topologies,
do not require industries to sacrifice financially, and allow industries
to practice their freedom in the market. We deem that the quality of
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an ISN implementation framework should be evaluated by (1) General-
ity as the level of flexibility in the sense of independence from agents’
internal reasoning processes (i.e., how much the framework adheres
to the principle of separation of concerns), (2) Expressivity as the level
of scalability in the sense of independence from size and topology of
the network, (3) Rationality as the level that the employed allocation
mechanisms comply to the collective as well as individual rationality
axiom (i.e., the framework should assume that no agent (group) partic-
ipates in a cooperative practice if they expect higher utility otherwise),
and (4) Autonomy as the level of allowance (i.e., non-restrictiveness) of
the employed coordination mechanisms. Then an ideal framework for
implementing ISNs should be general—i.e., it should allow for manip-
ulation in the sense that the network designer does not face any re-
engineering/calibration burden—sufficiently expressive, rationally ac-
ceptable for all firms, and respect their autonomy. The goal of this
paper is to develop an implementation framework for ISNs that has
properties close to the ideal one.
2.4. Previous Work at a Glance
The idea of employing cooperative game theory for analysis and im-
plementation of industrial symbiosis have only been sparsely explored
[21, 11, 45]. In [21], Grimes-Casey et al. used both cooperative and
non-cooperative game theory for analyzing the behavior of firms en-
gaged in a case-specific industrial ecology. While the analysis is ex-
pressive, the implemented relations are specific to refillable/disposable
bottle life-cycles. In [11], Chew et al. tailored a mechanism for allocat-
ing costs among participating agents that expects an involved industry
to “bear the extra cost”. Although such an approach results in collec-
tive benefits, it is not in-line with the individual rationality axiom. In
[45], Yazdanpanah and Yazan model bilateral industrial symbiotic re-
lations as cooperative games and show that in such a specific class of
symbiotic relations, the total operational costs can be allocated fairly
and stably. Our work relaxes the limitation on the number of involved
industries and—using the concept of Marginal Contribution Nets (MC-
Nets)—enables a representation that is sufficiently expressive to cap-
ture the regulatory aspect of ISNs. We will give a more detailed review
of these papers in Section 3.2 after covering the technical background.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the preliminary notions in cooperative
games, the MC-Net representation of such games, and the two prin-
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cipal solution concepts: the Shapley value and the Core3. Moreover,
we discuss in more detail the technical aspects of previous work that
applied game-theoretical methods for ISN modeling and analysis.
3.1. Technical Background
In this work, we build on the transferable utility assumption in mul-
tiagent settings. This is to assume that the payoff to a group of agents
involved in an ISN (as a cooperative practice) can be freely distributed
among group members.
Cooperative Games: Multiagent cooperative games with transferable
utility are often modeled by the tuple (N, v), where N is the finite set
of agents and v : 2N 7→ R is the characteristic function that maps each
possible agent group S ⊆ N to a real-valued payoff v(S). In such games,
the so-called allocation problem focuses on methods to distribute v(S)
among all the agents (in S) in a reasonable manner. That is, v(S) is the
result of a potential cooperative practice, hence ought to be distributed
among agents in S such that they all be induced to cooperate (or re-
main in the cooperation). Various solution concepts specify the utility
each agent receives by taking into account properties like fairness and
stability. The two standard solution concepts that characterize fair and
stable allocation of benefits are the Shapley value and the Core, respec-
tively.
Shapley Value: The Shapley value prescribes a notion of fairness. It
says that assuming the formation of the grand coalition N = {1, . . . , n},
each agent i ∈ N should receive its average marginal contribution over
all possible permutations of the agent groups. Let s and n, represent
the cardinality of S and N , respectively. Then, the Shapley value of i
under characteristic function v, denoted by Φi(v), is formally specified
as Φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n−s−1)!
n! (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)). For a game (N, v), the
unique list of real-valued payoffs x = (Φ1(v), · · · ,Φn(v)) ∈ Rn is called
the Shapley allocation for the game. The Shapley allocation have been
extensively studied in the game theory literature and satisfies various
desired properties in multi-agent practices. Moreover, it can be axiom-
atized using the following properties.
• Efficiency (EFF): The overall available utility v(N) is allocated to the
agents in N , i.e.,
∑
i∈N
Φi(v) = v(N).
• Symmetry (SYM): Any arbitrary agents i and j that make the same
contribution receive the same payoff, i.e., Φi(v) = Φj(v).
3The presented material on basics in cooperative games is based on [34, 30] while for
the MC-Net notations, we build on [24, 27].
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• Dummy Player (DUM): Any arbitrary agent i of which its marginal
contribution to each group S is the same, receives the payoff that it
can earn on its own; i.e., Φi(v) = v({i}).
• Additivity (ADD): For any two cooperative games (N, v) and (N,w),
Φi(u + w) = Φi(v) + Φi(w) for all i ∈ N , where for all S ⊆ N , the
characteristic function v + w is defined as (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S).
In the following, we refer to an allocation that satisfies these prop-
erties as a fair allocation.
Core of the Game: In core allocations, the focus is on the notion of
stability. In brief, an allocation is stable if no agent (group) benefits by
defecting the cooperation. Formally, for a game (N, v), any list of real-
valued payoffs x ∈ Rn that satisfies the following conditions is a core
allocation for the game:
• Rationality (RAT): ∀S ⊆ N : ∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)
• Efficiency (EFF): ∑
i∈N
xi = v(N)
One main question is whether for a given game, the core is non-
empty (i.e., that there exists a stable allocation for the game). A game
for which there exist a non-empty set of stable allocations should sat-
isfy the balancedness property, defined as follows. Let 1S ∈ Rn be the
membership vector of S, where (1S)i = 1 if i ∈ S and (1S)i = 0 otherwise.
Moreover, let (λS)S⊆N be a vector of weights λS ∈ [0, 1]. A vector (λS)S⊆N
is a balanced vector if for all i ∈ N , we have that ∑S⊆N λS(1S)i = 1.
Finally, a game is balanced if for all balanced vectors of weights, we
have that
∑
S⊆N λSv(S) ≤ v(N). According to the Bondereva-Shapley
theorem, a game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced
[36, 6].
In the following, we refer to an allocation that satisfies RAT and EFF
as a stable allocation.
Marginal Contribution Nets (MC-Nets): Representing cooperative games
by their characteristic functions (i.e., specifying values v(S) for all the
possible coalitions S ⊆ N ) may become unfeasible in large-scale appli-
cations. In this work, as we are aiming to implement ISNs in a scalable
manner, we employ a basic MC-Net [24] representation that uses a set
of rules to specify the value of possible agent coalitions. Moreover,
attempting to capture the regulatory aspect of ISNs makes employing
rule-based game representations a natural approach.
A basic MC-Net represents the cooperative game among agents in
N as a finite set of rules {ρi : (Pi,Ni) 7→ vi}i∈K , where Pi ⊆ N , Ni ⊂ N ,
Pi ∩ Ni = ∅, vi ∈ R \ {0}, and K is the set of rule indices. For an agent
coalition S ⊆ N , a rule ρi is applicable if Pi ⊆ S and Ni ∩ S = ∅ (i.e., S
contains all the agents in Pi and no agent in Ni). Let Π(S) denote the
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set of rule indices that are applicable to S. Then the value of S, denoted
by v(S), will be equal to
∑
i∈Π(S) vi. In further sections, we present an
MC-Net representation of the ijk ISN scenario and illustrate how this
rule-based representation enables applying norm-based coordination
to ISNs.
3.2. Revisiting Previous Work
Chew et al. in [11] analyze the interaction of participating com-
panies in an Eco-industrial park seeking to develop a game-theoretic
implementation framework for inter-plant water integration. In their
cooperative game model, by assuming the compliance of agents to their
commitments, the optimum collective benefit is achievable. As the au-
thors mention, in case the cooperation takes place, their allocation
mechanism results in higher collective payoff in comparison to their
non-cooperative game scheme. This result is achieved through adding
contextualized interaction protocols that compel the industries to act
in a desired manner. Roughly speaking, it is assumed that the network
manager has control over internal operations and decision processes of
involved agents (which may be applicable in specific case studies but is
in contrast with the principle of separation of concerns). For instance,
given the availability of an optimal wastewater interchange scheme, it
is shown that in case the agents adopt the scheme and act accordingly,
they can benefit both individually and collectively. In other words, the
focus is shifted towards providing methods for optimizing the scheme
in a specific case.
In a more recent work, Yazdanpanah and Yazan looked into the
modeling and implementation of industrial symbiotic relations as two
person cooperative games [45]. Their focus is on allocation of the total
operational cost among involved agents using a tailored version of the
Shapley value and the standard notion of core. They show that for in-
dustrial symbiotic relation games, core is non-empty and hence such
symbiotic practices are implementable in a stable manner. Moreover,
as the Shapley value will be in the core, it is rational for industries to
implement the Shapley allocation (with no need for interruption from
the regulatory agent). Notice that although their industrial symbiosis
implementation satisfies desired properties, e.g., autonomy and ratio-
nality, it is not expressive for implementing symbiotic relations among
three or more industries. This is basically because their analysis is
based on properties of two-person games.
Finally, Grimes-Casey et al. [21] focus on cooperative decision-
making and heterogeneity of the involved agents (with respect to their
epistemic states) in an industrial symbiosis scenario. They employ
cost-based mechanisms to nudge the behavior of manufacturer as well
as consumer agents towards using refillable beverage containers. Al-
though their cooperative management framework is problem-specific,
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it is expressive and scalable as they employ profit values that are com-
putable in low complexity. They also discuss that in real cases, the
applicability of most cooperative game solution concepts depends on
government enforcement. This is in-line with our attempt to capture
the regulatory aspect of industrial symbiosis using incentive mecha-
nisms.
4. ISN Games
As discussed in [1, 45], the total obtainable cost reduction—as the
economic benefit—and its allocation among involved firms are key drivers
behind the stability of ISNs. For any set of industrial agents S, this total
value can be computed based on the total traditional cost, denoted by
T (S), and the total ISN operational cost, denoted by O(S). In brief, T (S)
is the summation of all the costs that firms have to pay in case the ISN
does not occur (i.e., to discharge wastes and to purchase traditional pri-
mary inputs). On the other hand, O(S) is the summation of costs that
firms have to pay collectively in case the ISN is realized (i.e., the costs
for recycling and treatment, for transporting resources among firms,
and finally the transaction costs). Accordingly, for a non-empty finite
set of industrial agents S the obtainable symbiotic value v(S) is equal
to T (S)−O(S). In this work, we assume a potential ISN, with a positive
total obtainable value, and aim for tailoring game-theoretic value allo-
cation and accordingly coordination mechanisms that guarantee a fair
and stable implementation of the symbiosis.
4.1. ISNs as Cooperative Games
Our ijk ISN scenario can be modeled as a cooperative game in which
v(S) for any empty/singleton S is 0 and agent groups ij, ik, jk, and ijk
have the values 4, 5, 4, and 6, respectively. Note that as the focus of ISNs
are on the benefit values obtainable due to potential cost reductions,
all the empty and singleton agent groups have a zero value because
cost reduction is meaningless in such cases. In the game theory lan-
guage, the payoffs in ISN games are normalized. Moreover, the game is
superadditive in nature.4 So, given the traditional and operational cost
values for all the possible agent groups S (i.e., T (S) and O(S)) in the
non-empty finite set of industrial agents N , the ISN among agents in N
can be formally modeled as follows.
Definition 1 (ISN Games). Let N be a non-empty finite set of industrial
agents. Moreover, for any agent group S ⊆ N , let T (S) and O(S) respec-
tively denote the total traditional and operational costs for S. We say the
4Superadditivity implies that forming a symbiotic coalition of industrial agents either
results in no value or in a positive value. Implicitly, growth of a group can never result
in decrease of the value.
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ISN among industrial agents in N is a normalized superadditive cooper-
ative game (N, v) where v(S) is:
v(S) =
{
0, if |S| ≤ 1
T (S)−O(S), otherwise
According to the following proposition, basic MC-Nets can be used to
represent ISNs. In further sections, this representation aids combining
ISN games with normative coordination rules.
Proposition 1 (ISNs as MC-Nets). Any ISN can be represented as a ba-
sic MC-Net.
Proof. We provide a constructive proof by (1) introducing an algorithm
for specification of all the required MC-Net rules and (2) showing that
the constructed MC-Net is equal to the original ISN game. (1) - Let (N, v)
be an arbitrary ISN game among industrial agents in N . Moreover, let
S≥2 = {S ⊆ N : |S| ≥ 2} be the set of all agent groups with two or more
members and let K = |S≥2| denote its cardinality. We start with an
empty set of rules. Then for all agent groups Si ∈ S≥2, for i = 1, . . . ,K,
we add a rule {ρi : (Si, N \ Si) 7→ vi = T (Si) − O(Si)}. (2) - As in all
the constructed rules ρi it holds that Pi ∩ Ni = ∅ and Pi ∪ Ni = N ,
we have that
∑
i∈Π(S) vi is equal to v(S) for all the members of S≥2.
Moreover, Π(S) for empty and singleton agent groups would be empty,
hence reflects the 0 value for such groups in the original game. 
Note that the proof does not simply rely on the representation power
and expressivity of MC-Nets (as shown in [24]) but provides a con-
structive method that respects the context of industrial symbiosis and
related cost values to generate all the required rules for representing
ISNs as MC-Nets.
Example 1 (ISN Scenario). Our running example can be represented
by the basic MC-Net5 {ρ1 : (ij, k) 7→ 4, ρ2 : (ik, j) 7→ 5, ρ3 : (jk, i) 7→ 4, ρ4 :
(ijk, ∅) 7→ 6}.
4.2. Benefit Allocation Mechanisms and ISN Games
As discussed earlier, how firms share the obtainable ISN benefits
plays a key role in the process of ISN implementation, mainly due to
stability and fairness concerns. Roughly speaking, industrial firms are
economically rational firms that defect non-beneficial relations (insta-
bility) and mostly tend to reject ISN proposals in which benefits are not
shared with respect to their contribution (unfairness). In this work, we
5For notational simplicity, we avoid brackets around agent groups, e.g., we write ij
instead of {i, j}.
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focus on Core- and Shapley-allocation mechanisms as two standard
methods that characterize stability and fairness in cooperative games,
receptively. We show that these solution concepts are applicable in a
specific class of ISNs but are not generally scalable for value alloca-
tion in the implementation phase of ISNs. This motivates introducing
incentive mechanisms to guarantee the implementability of “desired”
ISNs.
4.2.1. Two-Person Industrial Symbiosis Games
When the game is between two industrial firms (i.e., a bilateral re-
lation between a resource receiver/provider couple), it has additional
properties that result in applicability of both Core and Shapley allo-
cations. We denote the class of such ISN games by ISNΛ. This is,
ISNΛ = {(N, v) : (N, v) is an ISN game and |N | = 2}. Moreover, the ISN
games in which three or more agents are involved will form ISN∆. The
class of ISNΛ games corresponds to the so called ISR games in [45].
The difference is on the value allocation perspective as in [45], they as-
sume the elimination of traditional costs (thanks to implementation of
the symbiotic relation) and focus on the allocation of operational costs;
while we focus on the allocation of the total benefit, obtainable due to
potential cost reductions.
Lemma 1 (ISNΛ Balancedness). Let (N, v) be an arbitrary ISNΛ game.
It always holds that (N, v) is balanced.
Proof. We show that any ISNΛ game is supermodular which directly
implies balancedness. A game (N, v) is supermodular iff for any couple
of arbitrary agent groups S, T ⊆ N , we have v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T )+v(S∩
T ). In ISNΛ games, by checking the validity of this inequality for all
the six possible S, T combinations, the claim will be proved. For S = ∅,
we have the following valid inequality v(∅) + v(T ) ≤ v(∅ ∪ T = T ) + v(∅).
For S = N , the inequality can be reformulated in the following valid
form v(N) + v(T ) ≤ v(N ∪ T = N) + v(N ∩ T = T ). Finally, when S and
T are equal to the only possible (disjoint) singleton groups, we have
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(N) + v(∅) which holds thanks to the superadditivity of
ISN games. 
Relying on Lemma 1, we have the following result that focuses on
the class of ISNΛ relations and shows the applicability of two standard
game-theoretic solution concepts for implementing fair and stable in-
dustrial symbiotic networks.
Theorem 1 (Fair and Stable ISNΛ Games). Let (N, v) be an arbitrary
ISNΛ game. The symbiotic relation among industrial agents in N is im-
plementable in a unique stable and fair manner.
Proof. Stability: As discussed earlier, core allocations guarantee the
stability conditions (i.e., RAT and EFF). However, the core is only an
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applicable solution concept for balanced games. According to Lemma
1, we have that ISNΛ games are balanced. Hence, the core of any arbi-
trary ISNΛ game is nonempty and any allocation in the core guarantees
the stability. Stability and Fairness: As presented earlier, the Shap-
ley allocation guarantees the fairness conditions (i.e., EFF, SYM, DUM,
ADD). However, it does not always satisfy the rationality (RAT) condi-
tion (which is necessary for stability). According to Lemma 1, we have
that ISNΛ games are balanced. Moreover, according to [37, Theorem
7], in balanced games, the Shapley allocation is a member of the core
and hence satisfies the rationality condition. Accordingly, for any ISNΛ
game, the Shapley allocation guarantees both the stability and fair-
ness. 
4.2.2. ISN Games
In this section we focus on ISN∆ games as the class of ISN games
with three or more participants and discuss the applicability of the
two above mentioned allocation mechanisms for implementing such
industrial games.
Example 2 (Neither Core Nor Shapley). Recall the ijk ISN∆ scenario
from Section 2. To have a stable allocation (xi, xj , xk) in the core, the
EFF condition implies xi + xj + xk = 6 while the RAT condition implies
xi + xj ≥ 4 ∧ xi + xk ≥ 5 ∧ xj + xk ≥ 4. As these conditions cannot
be satisfied simultaneously, we can conclude that the core is empty
and there exists no way to implement this ISN in a stable manner.
Moreover, although the Shapley allocation provides a fair allocation
(13/6, 10/6, 13/6), it is not rational for firms to implement the ISN. E.g.,
i and k obtain 30/6 in case they defect while according to the Shapley
allocation, they ought to sacrifice as they collectively have 26/6.
As illustrated in this example, the Core of ISN∆ games may be empty
which implies the inapplicability of this solution concept as a general
method for implementing ISNs. We now generalize the exemplified idea
to the following nonexistence theorem about implementability of ISN∆
games in a fair and stable manner.
Theorem 2 (Unimplementability of ISN∆ Games). Let (N, v) be an ar-
bitrary ISN∆ game. The symbiotic relation among industrial agents in N
is not generally implementable in a stable manner.
Proof. Although all ISN∆ games are superadditive and hence result in
a positive obtainable benefit, they may be unbalanced (as illustrated
in the running example). Accordingly, for any unbalanced ISN∆ game,
the Core is empty. In such cases, the symbiotic relation is not imple-
mentable in a stable manner. 
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Note that the fair implementation of ISN∆ games is not always in
compliance with the rationality condition. This theorem—in accor-
dance with the intuition presented in example 2—shows that we lack
general methods that guarantee stability and fairness of ISN implemen-
tations. So, even if an industrial symbiotic practice could result in
collective economic and environmental benefits, it may not last due to
instable or unfair implementations. One natural response which is in-
line with realistic ISN practices is to employ monetary incentives as a
means of coordination.
5. Coordinated ISN
In realistic ISNs, the symbiotic practice takes place in the presence
of economic, social, and environmental policies and under regulations
that aim to enforce the policies by nudging the behavior of agents to-
wards desired ones. In other words, while the policies generally indi-
cate whether an ISN is “good (bad, or neutral)”, the regulations are a set
of norms that—in case of agents’ compliance—result in a spectrum of
acceptable (collective) behaviors. Note that the acceptability, i.e., good-
ness, is evaluated and ought to be verified from the point of view of the
policy-makers as community representatives. In this section, we follow
this normative approach and aim for using normative coordination to
guarantee the implementability of desirable ISNs in a stable and fair
manner6.
5.1. Normative Coordination of ISNs
Following [40, 22], we see that during the process of ISN implemen-
tation as a game, norms can be employed as game transformations,
i.e., as “ways of transforming existing games in order to bring about
outcomes that are more desirable from a welfaristic point of view”[22].
For this account, given the economic, environmental, and social dimen-
sions and with respect to potential socio-economic consequences, in-
dustrial symbiotic networks can be partitioned in three classes, namely
promoted, permitted, and prohibited ISNs. Such a classification can
be modeled by a normative socio-economic policy function ℘ : 2N 7→
{p+, p◦, p−}, where N is the finite set of industrial firms. Moreover, p+,
p◦, and p− are labels—assigned by a third-party authority—indicating
that the ISN among any given agent group is either promoted, permit-
ted, or prohibited, respectively. The three sets P+℘ , P
◦
℘, and P
−
℘ con-
sist of all the ℘-promoted, -permitted, and -prohibited agent groups,
respectively. Formally P+℘ = {S ⊆ N : ℘(S) = p+} (P ◦℘ and P−℘ can
be formulated analogously). Note that ℘ is independent of the ISN
6In the following, we simply say implementability of ISNs instead of implementability in
a fair and stable manner.
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game among agents in S, its economic figures, and corresponding cost
values—in general, it is independent of the value function of the game.
E.g., a symbiotic relation may be labeled with p− by policy ℘—as it is
focused on exchanging a hazardous waste—even if it results in a high
level of obtainable benefit.
Example 3 (Normative ISNs). In our ijk ISN scenario, imagine a policy
℘1 that assigns p− to all the singleton and two-member groups (e.g.,
because they discharge hazardous wastes in case they operate in one-
or two-member groups) and p+ to the grand coalition (e.g., because in
that case they have zero waste discharge). So, according to ℘1, the ISN
among all the three agents is “desirable” while other possible coalitions
lead to “undesirable” ISNs.
As illustrated in Example 3, any socio-economic policy function
merely indicates the desirability of a potential ISN among a given group
of agents and is silent with respect to methods for enforcing the imple-
mentability of promoted or unimplementability of prohibited ISNs. Note
that ISNΛ games are always implementable. So, ISNs’ implementability
refers to the general class of ISN games including ISN∆ games.
The rationale behind introducing socio-economic policies for ISNs is
mainly to make sure that the set of promoted ISNs are implementable in
a fair and stable manner while prohibited ones are instable. To ensure
this, in real ISN practices, the regulatory agent (i.e., the regional or
national government) introduces regulations—to support the policy—
in the form of monetary incentives7. This is to ascribe subsidies to
promoted and taxes to prohibited collaborations (see [26] for an im-
plementation theory approach on mechanisms that employ monetary
incentives to achieve desirable resource allocations). We follow this
practice and employ a set of rules to ensure/avoid the implementability
of desired/undesired ISNs among industrial agents in N via allocating
incentives. Such a set of incentive rules can be represented by an MC-
Net < = {ρi : (Pi,Ni) 7→ ιi}i∈K in which K is the set of rule indices. Let
=(S) denote the set of rule indices that are applicable to S ⊆ N . Then,
the incentive value for S, denoted by ι(S), is defined as
∑
i∈=(S) ιi. This
is, a set of incentive rules can be represented also as a cooperative
game < = (N, ι) among agents in N . The following proposition shows
that for any ISN game there exists a set of incentive rules to guarantee
the implementability of the ISN in question.
Proposition 2 (Implementability Ensuring Rules). Let G be an arbi-
trary ISN game among industrial agents in N . There exists a set of incen-
tive rules to guarantee the implementability of G.
7See [32, 48] for similar approaches on incentivizing cooperative agent systems.
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Proof. Recall that according to Proposition 1, G can be represented as
an MC-Net. To prove the claim, we provide Algorithm 1 that takes the
MC-Net representation of G as the input and generates a set of rules
that guarantee the implementability of G.
Algorithm 1 Generating rule set < for ISN game G.
1: Data: ISN game G = {ρi : (Pi,Ni) 7→ vi}i∈K among agents in N ; K
the set of rule indices for G.
2: Result: Incentive rule set < for G.
3: n← length(K) and < = {}
4: for i← 1 to n do
5: if i ∈ Π(N) then
6: < ← < ∪ {ρi : (Pi,Ni) 7→ 0}
7: else
8: < ← < ∪ {ρi : (Pi,Ni) 7→ −vi}
9: end if
10: end for
By allocating −vi to rules that are not applicable to N , any coalition
other than the grand coalition will be faced with a tax value. As the
original game is superadditive, the agents will have a rational incentive
to cooperate in N and the ISN is implementable in a stable manner
thanks to the provided incentive rules. 
Till now, we introduced socio-economic policies and regulations as
required (but not yet integrated) elements for modeling coordinated
ISNs. In the following section, we combine the idea behind incen-
tive regulations and normative socio-economic policies to introduce the
concept of Coordinated ISNs (C−ISNs) as a multiagent system for imple-
menting industrial symbiosis.
5.2. Coordinated ISNs
As discussed above, ISN games can be combined with a set of reg-
ulatory rules that allocate incentives to agent groups (in the form of
subsidies and taxes). We call this class of games, ISNs in presence of
coordination mechanisms, or Coordinated ISNs (C−ISNs) in brief.
Definition 2 (Coordinated ISN Games (C−ISN)). Let G be an ISN and
< be a set of regulatory incentive rules, both as MC-Nets among industrial
agents in N . Moreover, for each agent group S ⊆ N , let v(S) and ι(S)
denote the value of S in G and the incentive value of S in <, respectively.
We say the Coordinated ISN Game (C−ISN) among industrial agents in N
is a cooperative game (N, c) where for each agent group S, we have that
c(S) = v(S) + ι(S).
Note that as both the ISN game G and the set of regulatory incentive
rules < are MC-Nets among industrial agents in N , then for each agent
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group S ⊆ N we have that c(S) is equal to the summation of all the
applicable rules to S in both G and <. Formally, c(S) = ∑i∈Π(S) vi +∑
j∈=(S) ιj where Π(S) and =(S) denote the set of applicable rules to S in
G and <, respectively. Moreover, vi and ιj denote the value of applicable
rules i and j in Π(S) and =(S), respectively. We sometime use G + <
to denote the game C as the result of incentivizing G with <. The next
proposition shows the role of regulatory rules in the enforcement of
socio-economic policies.
Proposition 3 (Policy Enforcing Rules). For any promoted ISN game
G under policy ℘, there exist an implementable C−ISN game C.
Proof. To prove, for any arbitrary promoted G, we require a set of reg-
ulatory incentive rules < such that its combination with G results in
a stable C implementation. The algorithm for generating such a < is
presented in the proof of Proposition 2. 
Analogously, similar properties hold for avoiding prohibited ISNs or
allowing permitted ones. Avoiding prohibited ISNs can be achieved by
making the C−ISN (that results from introducing regulatory incentives)
unimplementable. On the other hand, allowing permitted ISNs would
be simply the result of adding an empty set of regulatory rules. The
presented approach for incentivizing ISNs, is advisable when the policy-
maker is aiming to ensure the implementability of a promoted ISN in an
ad-hoc way. In other words, an < that ensures the implementability of
a promoted ISN G1 may ruin the implementability of another promoted
ISN G2. This highlights the importance of some structural properties for
socio-economic policies that aim to foster the implementability of de-
sired ISNs. As we discussed in Section 2, we aim for implementing ISNs
such that the rationality axiom will be respected. In the following, we
focus on the subtleties of socio-economic policies that are enforced by
regulatory rules. The question is, what are the requirements of a policy
that can ensure the rationality of staying in desired ISNs? We first show
that to respect the rationality axiom, promoted agent groups should be
disjoint. We illustrate that in case the policy-maker takes this condition
into account, industrial agents have no economic incentive to defect an
implementable promoted ISN.
Proposition 4 (Mutual Exclusivity of Promoted ISNs). Let G1 and G2
be arbitrary ISNs, respectively among promoted (nonempty) agent groups
S1 and S2 under policy ℘ (i.e., S1, S2 ∈ P+℘ ). Moreover, let <1 and <2 be
rule sets that ensure the implementability of G1 and G2, respectively. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, defecting from C−ISN Ci = Gi + <i is not economically rational
for any agent a ∈ Si iff S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
Proof. “ ⇒ ”: Suppose S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅. Accordingly, we have an agent a
which is both a member of S1 and S2. For a it is rational to defect either
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S1 or S2 as both the two C−ISNs that are based on the two groups are
implementable.
“⇐ ”: Suppose S1 and S2 are disjoint promoted agent groups under
℘. As <1 and <2 can respectively ensure the implementability of these
two groups and based on Proposition 1, we have that ISNs among firms
in S1 and S2 are both implementable in a stable manner. Hence, they
satisfy the rationality axiom. Moreover, as the two agent groups share
no agent, there will be no economic incentive to deviate between the
two stable ISNs. 
Accordingly, given a set of industrial agents in N and a socio-economic
policy ℘ we directly have that:
Proposition 5 (Minimality of Promoted ISNs). For n = |P+℘ | if
n⋂
i=1
Si ∈
P+℘ = ∅ then any arbitrary Si ∈ P+℘ is minimal (i.e., S′i 6∈ P+℘ for any
S′i ⊂ Si).
Roughly speaking, the exclusivity condition for promoted agent groups
entails that any agent is in at most one promoted group. Hence, devia-
tion of agents does not lead to a larger promoted group as no promoted
group is part of a promoted super-group, or contains a promoted sub-
group. In the following, we show that the mutual exclusivity condition
is sufficient for ensuring the implementability of all the ISNs that take
place among promoted groups of firms.
Theorem 3 (Conditioned Implementability). LetG be an arbitrary ISN∆
game under policy ℘ among industrial agents in N and n be the cardi-
nality of P+℘ . If
n⋂
i=1
Si ∈ P+℘ = ∅, then there exists a set of regulatory rules
<, such that all the promoted symbiotic networks are implementable in
the coordinated ISN defined by C = G + <. Moreover, any ISN among
prohibited agent groups in P−℘ will be unimplementable.
Proof. To prove, we provide a method to generate such an implementabil-
ity ensuring set of rules. We start with an empty <. Then for all n
promoted Si ∈ P+℘ , we call the provided algorithm in Proposition 2.
Each single run of this algorithm results in a <i that guarantees the
implementability of the industrial symbiosis among the set of firms in
the promoted group Si. As the set of promoted agent groups comply
to the mutual exclusivity condition, the unification of all the regula-
tory rules results in a general <. Formally, < =
n⋃
i=1
<i. Moreover, as
the algorithm applies taxation on non-promoted groups, no ISN among
prohibited agent groups will be implementable. 
Example 4 (ijk as a Normatively Coordinated C−ISN). Recalling the
ISN scenario in Example 3, the only promoted group is the grand coali-
tion while other possible agent groups are prohibited. To ensure the
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implementability of the unique promoted group and to avoid the im-
plementability of other groups, the result of executing our algorithm is
< = {ρ1 : (ij, k) 7→ −4, ρ2 : (ik, j) 7→ −5, ρ3 : (jk, i) 7→ −4}. In the C−ISN that
results from adding < to the original ISN, industrial symbiosis among
firms in the promoted group is implementable while all the prohibited
groups cannot implement a stable symbiosis.
5.3. Realized ISNs and Budget-Balancedness
As we mentioned in the beginning of Section 5, regulations are
norms that in case of agents’ compliance bring about the desired be-
havior. For instance, in Example 4, although according to the pro-
vided tax-based rules, defecting the grand coalition is not economically
rational, it is probable that agents act irrationally—e.g., due to trust-
/reputation-related issues—and go out of the promoted group. This
results in possible normative behavior of a C−ISN with respect to an
established policy ℘. So, assuming that based on evidences the set of
implemented ISNs are realizable, we have the following abstract defini-
tion of C−ISN’s normative behavior under a socio-economic policy.
Definition 3 (C−ISN’s Normative Behavior). Let C be a C−ISN among
industrial agents in N under policy ℘ and let E be the evidence set that
includes all the implemented ISNs among agents in N . We say the behav-
ior of C complies to ℘ according to E iff E = P+℘ ; and violates it otherwise.
Given an ISN under a policy, we introduced a set of regulatory rules
to ensure that all the promoted ISNs will be implementable. However,
although providing incentives makes them implementable, the auton-
omy of industrial agents may result in situations that not all the pro-
moted agent groups implement their ISN. So, although we can ensure
the implementability of all the promoted ISNs, the real behavior may
deviate from a desired one. As our introduced method for guaranteeing
the implementability of ISNs among promoted agent groups is mainly
tax-based, if a C−ISN violates the policy, we end up with collectible tax
values. In such cases, our tax-based method can become a balanced-
budget monetary incentive mechanism (as discussed in [23, 28, 35]) by
employing a form of “Robin-Hood” principle and redistributing the col-
lected amount among promoted agent groups that implemented their
ISN. In the following, we provide an algorithm that guarantees budget-
balancedness by means of a Shapley-based redistribution of the col-
lectible tax value among agents that implemented promoted ISNs.
The correctness of Algorithm 2 is established in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 (Budget Balancedness and Fairness). Let C = G + <
be a C−ISN among industrial agents in N under policy ℘ such that all
the ISNs among promoted groups are implementable (using the provided
method in Theorem 3) and let E be the set of implemented ISNs. For
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Algorithm 2 Tax Redistribution for C−ISN game C.
1: Data: C = G + < the C−ISN game among industrial agents in N
under policy ℘ such that all the ISNs among promoted groups in P+℘
are implementable; E the set of implemented ISNs; The collectible
tax value τ .
2: Result: Ωi(C,℘) the distributable incentive value to i ∈ N .
3: S+ ← E ∩ P+℘ , S+u ←
⋃
S∈S+
S
4: for all i ∈ (S+u , v) the sub-game of G do
5: k ← Φi(v) the Shapley value of i in (S+u , v)
6: Ωi(C,℘) =
1
v(S+u )
.τ.k
7: end for
any C−ISN, the incentive values returned by Algorithm 2 ensures budget
balancedness while preserving fairness (i.e., EFF, SYM, DUM, and ADD).
Proof. To have budget balancedness, we have to show that the total
collectible tax value (using the provided method in Theorem 3) is equal
to allocated subsidies. (Considering a disposal account—under control
of the regulatory agent—for each firm, it is reasonable to assume that
collectible τ is equal to collected τ .) If the C−ISN is ℘-compliant, this
is obvious as τ is equal to zero (thanks to the implementation of all
the promoted ISNs). When the C−ISN is ℘-violating, we use the Shapley
value of each agent that contributes to the sub-game of implemented
promoted ISNs. As we employ a Shapley-based method, the monetary
incentive is budget-balanced thanks to the EFF property and in addi-
tion preserves the other three properties (i.e., SYM, DUM, and ADD).
Note that the redistribution phase takes place after the implementa-
tion of the ISNs and with respect to the evidence set E. Otherwise, there
will be cases in which the redistribution process provides incentives
for agent groups to defect the set of promoted collaborations. More-
over, we highlight that the use of an MC-net representation of games
enables calculating the Shapley value in a scalable manner—in Algo-
rithm 2 (see [24] for complexity results). In specific, the Shapley value
of an agent in MC-nets is equal to the summation of its Shapley val-
ues in each MC-net rule. Accordingly, as in each rule the value can be
computed in linear time (in the pattern of the rule), the Shapley value
computation for the whole game will be linear in the size of the input.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a coordinated multiagent system—rooted in co-
operative game theory—for implementing ISNs that take place under a
socio-economic policy. The use of rule-based MC-Net representation of
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cooperative games enables combining the game with the set of policies
and regulations in a natural way. The paper also provides algorithms
that generate regulatory rules to ensure the implementability of “good”
symbiotic collaborations in the eye of the policy-maker. This extends
previous work that merely focused on operational aspects of industrial
symbiotic relations–as we introduce the analytical study of the regula-
tory aspect of ISNs. Finally, it introduces a method for redistribution
of collectible tax values. The presented method ensures the budget-
balancedness of the monetary incentive mechanism for coordination of
ISNs in the implementation phase.
In practice, such a framework supports decision-makers in the ISN
implementation phase by providing operational semantics as tools for
reasoning about the implementability of a given ISN in a fair and stable
manner. Moreover, it supports policy-makers aiming to foster socio-
economically desirable ISNs—by providing algorithms that generate the
required regulatory rules. Finally, it shows that MC-Net is an ex-
pressive representation framework for applying normative coordination
mechanisms to multiagent systems.
This paper focuses on a unique socio-economic policy and a set of
rules to ensure it. In this regard, one question that deserves investi-
gation is the possibility of having multiple policies and thus analytical
tools for policy option analysis [31] in ISNs. Such a framework assists
ranking and investigating the applicability of a set of policies in a partic-
ular ISN scenario. Along this line, we aim to generate a regulation tool-
box for ISN policy-makers—since a single regulation may be incapable
of ensuring all the desired collaborations under potentially conflicting
policies. In that case, possible conflicts among regulations can be re-
solved using prioritized rule sets (inspired by methods for dealing with
potential extensions in argumentation theory [33, 25]). Accordingly,
we will have distinguishable potential ISN worlds such that in each a
maximal set of promoted ISNs are implementable. Another approach to
address this is by building upon multiagent-based Delphi implementa-
tions [20] and generating sets of nonconflicting, collectively acceptable
rules. Here, we consider firm managers as the panel of experts. This
can be integrated with agent-oriented representation methods [19] to
analyze how panel transformations affect the implementability of socio-
economic policies.
In future work, we also aim to focus on administration of ISNs. Then,
information-sharing issues [9, 18] and compliance of involved agents
to their commitments will be main concerns for automated trading and
business implementations in multiagent industrial symbiosis systems
[4]. For that, we plan to model ISNs as normative multiagent organi-
zations [46, 5] and integrate data-driven coordination techniques [41].
Thence, we can rely on norm-aware organization frameworks that fo-
cus on operation of normative organizations [13, 2, 12] to monitor the
organization’s behavior. Finally, we aim to illustrate the validity of our
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formally verified framework using realistic case studies and multiagent-
based simulations [17].
Acknowledgments
SHAREBOX [38], the project leading to this work, has received fund-
ing from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under grant agreement No. 680843.
References
[1] Albino, V., Fraccascia, L., and Giannoccaro, I. (2016). Exploring the
role of contracts to support the emergence of self-organized industrial
symbiosis networks: an agent-based simulation study. Journal of
Cleaner Production, 112:4353–4366.
[2] Aldewereld, H., Dignum, F., Garcı´a-Camino, A., Noriega, P.,
Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, J. A., and Sierra, C. (2007). Operationalisation
of norms for electronic institutions. In Coordination, Organizations,
Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems II, pages 163–176. Springer.
[3] Andrighetto, G., Governatori, G., Noriega, P., and van der Torre,
L. W. (2013). Normative multi-agent systems, volume 4. Schloss
Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik.
[4] Ash, D. W. (2004). Empowering automated trading in multi-agent
environments. Computational Intelligence, 20(4):562–583.
[5] Boissier, O. and Van Riemsdijk, M. B. (2013). Organisational rea-
soning agents. In Agreement Technologies, pages 309–320. Springer.
[6] Bondareva, O. N. (1963). Some applications of linear programming
methods to the theory of cooperative games. Problemy kibernetiki,
10:119–139.
[7] Borm, P., Hamers, H., and Hendrickx, R. (2001). Operations re-
search games: A survey. Top, 9(2):139.
[8] Bussmann, S., Jennings, N. R., and Wooldridge, M. (2013). Mul-
tiagent systems for manufacturing control: a design methodology.
Springer Science & Business Media.
[9] Carter, J., Bitting, E., and Ghorbani, A. A. (2002). Reputation for-
malization for an information–sharing multi–agent system. Compu-
tational Intelligence, 18(4):515–534.
[10] Chertow, M. R. (2000). Industrial symbiosis: literature and taxon-
omy. Annual review of energy and the environment, 25(1):313–337.
22
[11] Chew, I. M. L., Tan, R. R., Foo, D. C. Y., and Chiu, A. S. F.
(2009). Game theory approach to the analysis of inter-plant water
integration in an eco-industrial park. Journal of Cleaner Production,
17(18):1611–1619.
[12] Dastani, M., Sardin˜a, S., and Yazdanpanah, V. (2017). Norm en-
forcement as supervisory control. In PRIMA 2017: Principles and
Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 20th International Conference, Nice,
France, October 30 - November 3, 2017, Proceedings, pages 330–348.
[13] Dastani, M., van der Torre, L., and Yorke-Smith, N. (2016).
Commitments and interaction norms in organisations. Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, pages 1–43.
[14] DInverno, G., Carosi, L., and Romano, G. (2020). Environmen-
tal sustainability and service quality beyond economic and financial
indicators: A performance evaluation of italian water utilities. Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences, page 100852.
[15] Driessen, T. S. (2013). Cooperative games, solutions and applica-
tions, volume 3. Springer Science & Business Media.
[16] Fathalikhani, S., Hafezalkotob, A., and Soltani, R. (2020). Gov-
ernment intervention on cooperation, competition, and coopetition
of humanitarian supply chains. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences,
69:100715.
[17] Fraccascia, L., Giannoccaro, I., and Albino, V. (2017). Efficacy of
landfill tax and subsidy policies for the emergence of industrial sym-
biosis networks: An agent-based simulation study. Sustainability,
9(4):521.
[18] Fraccascia, L. and Yazan, D. M. (2018). The role of online
information-sharing platforms on the performance of industrial sym-
biosis networks. Resources, Conservation and Recycling.
[19] Garcı´a-Magarin˜o, I. (2013). A collection of method fragments au-
tomated with model transformations in agent-oriented modeling. En-
gineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 26(3):1131–1148.
[20] Garcı´a-Magarin˜o, I., Go´mez-Sanz, J. J., and Pe´rez-Agu¨era, J. R.
(2008). A multi-agent based implementation of a delphi process. In
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous
agents and multiagent systems-Volume 3, pages 1543–1546. Interna-
tional Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
[21] Grimes-Casey, H. G., Seager, T. P., Theis, T. L., and Powers, S. E.
(2007). A game theory framework for cooperative management of re-
fillable and disposable bottle lifecycles. Journal of Cleaner Production,
15(17):1618–1627.
23
[22] Grossi, D., Tummolini, L., and Turrini, P. (2013). Norms in game
theory. In Agreement Technologies, pages 191–197. Springer.
[23] Guo, M. and Conitzer, V. (2008). Optimal-in-expectation redis-
tribution mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 7th international joint
conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems-Volume 2,
pages 1047–1054. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems.
[24] Ieong, S. and Shoham, Y. (2005). Marginal contribution nets: a
compact representation scheme for coalitional games. In Proceedings
of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 193–202.
ACM.
[25] Kaci, S. and van der Torre, L. (2008). Preference-based argumen-
tation: Arguments supporting multiple values. International Journal
of Approximate Reasoning, 48(3):730–751.
[26] Kakhbod, A. (2013). Resource allocation in decentralized systems
with strategic agents: an implementation theory approach. Springer
Science & Business Media.
[27] Lesca, J., Perny, P., and Yokoo, M. (2017). Coalition structure
generation and cs-core: Results on the tractability frontier for games
represented by mc-nets. In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, pages 308–316. Interna-
tional Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
[28] Li, C., Rajan, U., Chawla, S., and Sycara, K. (2003). Mechanisms
for coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace.
In Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic com-
merce, pages 68–77. ACM.
[29] Lombardi, D. R. and Laybourn, P. (2012). Redefining industrial
symbiosis. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 16(1):28–37.
[30] Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., Green, J. R., et al. (1995). Microe-
conomic theory, volume 1. Oxford university press New York.
[31] Mehryar, S., Sliuzas, R., Sharifi, A., Reckien, D., and van Maarse-
veen, M. (2017). A structured participatory method to support policy
option analysis in a social-ecological system. Journal of Environmen-
tal Management, 197:360–372.
[32] Meir, R., Rosenschein, J. S., and Malizia, E. (2011). Subsidies,
stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games. In IJCAI
2011, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16-22, 2011, pages
301–306.
24
[33] Modgil, S. and Prakken, H. (2013). A general account of argumen-
tation with preferences. Artificial Intelligence, 195:361–397.
[34] Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory.
MIT press.
[35] Phelps, S., McBurney, P., and Parsons, S. (2010). Evolutionary
mechanism design: a review. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, 21(2):237–264.
[36] Shapley, L. S. (1967). On balanced sets and cores. Naval research
logistics quarterly, 14(4):453–460.
[37] Shapley, L. S. (1971). Cores of convex games. International journal
of game theory, 1(1):11–26.
[38] SHAREBOX (2020). Secure Sharing. http://
sharebox-project.eu/. Accessed: 2020-06-02.
[39] Shen, N. and Peng, H. (2020). Can industrial agglomeration
achieve the emission-reduction effect? Socio-Economic Planning Sci-
ences, page 100867.
[40] Shoham, Y. and Tennenholtz, M. (1995). On social laws for ar-
tificial agent societies: off-line design. Artificial intelligence, 73(1-
2):231–252.
[41] Wardi, Y., Cassandras, C. G., and Cao, X. (2018). Perturba-
tion analysis: A framework for data-driven control and optimization
of discrete event and hybrid systems. Annual Reviews in Control,
45:267–280.
[42] Wooldridge, M. (2009). An introduction to multiagent systems. John
Wiley & Sons.
[43] Yazan, D. M., Romano, V. A., and Albino, V. (2016). The design of
industrial symbiosis: An input–output approach. Journal of cleaner
production, 129:537–547.
[44] Yazan, D. M., Yazdanpanah, V., and Fraccascia, L. (2020). Learn-
ing strategic cooperative behavior in industrial symbiosis: A game-
theoretic approach integrated with agent-based simulation. Business
Strategy and the Environment, ():to appear.
[45] Yazdanpanah, V. and Yazan, D. M. (2017). Industrial symbiotic
relations as cooperative games. In Proceedings of the 7th Interna-
tional Conference on Industrial Engineering and Systems Management
(IESM-2017), pages 455–460. International Institute for Innovation,
Industrial Engineering and Entrepreneurship.
25
[46] Yazdanpanah, V., Yazan, D. M., and Zijm, W. H. M. (2016). Norma-
tive industrial symbiotic networks: A position paper. In Multi-Agent
Systems and Agreement Technologies, pages 314–321. Springer.
[47] Yazdanpanah, V., Yazan, D. M., and Zijm, W. H. M. (2019). FISOF:
A formal industrial symbiosis opportunity filtering method. Engineer-
ing Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 81:247–259.
[48] Zick, Y., Polukarov, M., and Jennings, N. R. (2013). Taxation and
stability in cooperative games. In International conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS ’13, Saint Paul,
MN, USA, May 6-10, 2013, pages 523–530.
26
